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1.    INTRODUCTION
Several researchers have analysed the evolution of income distribution to
detect the levels of inequality and poverty that characterise a specific popula-
tion (see for instance Atkinsons and Brandolini, 2001). These contributions gen-
erally aim at providing a picture of increases in inequality, household impover-
ishment or the disappearance of the middle class often discussed in public
debate. The present paper builds on this strand in the literature, taking into
account the considerable changes that have occurred in the labour market, in the
social security system, and Italian society more generally. First, we define an
indicator to capture income inequality amongst households under the assump-
tion of equal sharing of resources; second, we analyse the flow of monetary
contribution within the family (i.e. we identify who gains and who loses from
this hypothesised equal sharing) and its determinants, using the 2010 Italian
Statistics on Income Living Conditions (IT-Silc).
The estimates show that monetary contributions vary by gender. More
educated women are more likely to be able to equalise consumption among
family components, while for men education is not significant once economic
activities are controlled for. As expected, more stable labour contracts enhance
the probability of making a positive contribution to the other family members.
Households more involved in family activities have less time to allocate to paid
jobs, and therefore they contribute less than other members to reducing income
inequalities. Predicted values underline that men and women behave different-
ly based on age, and recognise males as the primary breadwinner.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 analyses the relationships
between the determinants of income differences among family components and
the empirical evidence and presents the theoretical framework. Section 3
describes the data; Section 4 presents the results; and Section 5 contains con-
cluding remarks. 
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2.   BACKGROUND
Italy exhibits the most unequal distribution of wages and salaries amongst
individuals, especially because of differences in demographic structure, social
composition, and employment conditions. This paper aims to provide some use-
ful insights into the factors related to income differences among family compo-
nents. For instance, families where the household head is aged 40 years or less
are not particularly widespread in Italy (about 14.5% of our sample). This is due
to the higher propensity of Italian young adults to postpone departure from their
parental home. It also reflects the role played by employment conditions and
parents’ and children’s incomes in the latter’s decision to leave the parental
home and take the relative risk of being poor (see Belloc, 2009; Manacorda and
Moretti, 2006; Mazzotta, 2007; Parisi, 2008; Iacovou and Parisi, 2009; Becker
et al., 2010). The inclusion of other demographic characteristics should provide
a better understanding of the income differences that emerge at the family level,
including the gender of the family’s components. Discerning the link between
personal characteristics and the attitude to income differences at the micro level
(i.e. within the household) might help policy makers to define interventions to
overcome income inequalities at the macro level. 
However, survey data providing reliable information that describes the
sharing of resources in the household are scarce (see Jenkins, 1991). For exam-
ple, the Bank of Italy (Survey on Household Income and Wealth - SHIW) col-
lects information on income transfers exclusively between family members liv-
ing in different households; the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in
Europe (SHARE) provides information on monetary transfers between individ-
uals within a family, but includes only people aged 50 and over, which means the
sample is composed almost entirely of retired individuals. The ECHP dataset
collects individual money transfers received and assumes that transfers occur
between household heads in the form of financial support from relatives, friends
or others not living in the household, but provides no information on monetary
contributions made among members of families living in the same household.
This paper attempts to fill in some of these gaps. It employs the OECD
procedure (OECD, 2001) to calculate individual monetary contributions, based
on the 2010 Italian Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (IT-Silc) survey
questionnaire, which uses a comprehensive set of up-to-date measures of
observed characteristics at the individual and family levels. Our indicator is
defined as the difference between the personal and per-capita income divided
by the equivalent family income. We make certain assumptions: first, for each
family member we assume personal consumption is equal to per-capita income.
This hypothesis of equal sharing of resources among all family members relies
on the unitary household decision making model (Becker, 1974 and 1981;
Samuelson, 1956). Although the income pooling hypothesis is controversial in
the literature (see for instance: Browning et al., 1994; Browning and Chiappori,
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1998, Findlay and Wright, 1996; Jianakoplos and Bernasek, 2008), in the exer-
cise in this paper, we are not interested in modelling individual bargaining
power. The baseline objective is to identify the determinants explaining income
differences amongst family components and how they might increase the need
of individual family members to share a part of their personal income with oth-
ers, in order to offset the emerging inequality. Second, we assume that a fami-
ly component should give (receive) to (from) the others the amount of his per-
sonal income that exceeds (is less than) the per-capita amount. This results
directly from implementation of the OECD procedure and relies on the motiva-
tions embedded in Becker’s ‘altruistic model’ (1974), Berneheim et al.’s (1985)
and Cox’s (1987) ‘exchange models’, and complies with family rules (i.e. fam-
ily constitution) (Cigno, 1993). In particular, the altruistic model suggests that
individuals’ transfers of money to others stems from a desire to increase the
other’s well-being. In other words, the giver of money derives direct utility
from the increased utility of the receiver. According to the exchange model,
transfers to other individuals are made in return for services received; for
instance, a parent might promise a bequest in exchange for an offspring’s com-
panionship. Another explanation for voluntary money transfers might be the
existence of a self-enforcing ‘family constitution’ (Cigno, 1993), which is a set
of unwritten rules prescribing the amount of money that a family component is
required to donate to the components in need. Regardless of the prevailing
framework and relative implications in the form of different outcomes from
public policies to redistribute income, these other motives that undoubtedly
drive transfer behaviour and predict and support similar qualitative results
regarding removing income inequality since we assume that family members
act as an income-equalising institution. 
Thus, we include personal and family characteristics in the analysis in
order to capture their effects on reducing income inequality amongst family
components. Our indicator depends on whether the individual has a job and also
on the amount of the salary received, compared to other members of the house-
hold. Consequently, the specifications take account of labour supply theory
(Becker, 1965 and 1981; Gilbert and Becker, 1975) as well as the motives of
intra-household transfer discussed above (i.e. Becker, 1974; Cox, 1987). Gen-
der, age and education level are used as proxies for the different labour market
participation of individuals (for gender and education see Becker, 1965, 1981;
for an age and life cycle hypothesis see Gilbert and Becker, 1975; Heckman and
Macurdy, 1980; Macurdy, 1981).
According to the literature, all these variables influence the decision to
work. Overall females, all other things being equal, are less likely to have a job
than their male counterparts because of potential exposure to interruptions, espe-
cially due to pregnancy at the beginning of their work careers (Del Boca
1997 and 2002; Del Boca and Locatelli, 2006; Chiuri, 2000). The more limited
female participation in the job market is also a consequence of the bargaining
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power in the family, in which women are charged with child/elderly care and
males are considered the breadwinners. Thus, these social and cultural norms do
not help women reconcile their household responsibilities with work activities
(Gauthier and Hatzius, 1997; Engelhardt and Prskawetx, 2004; Del Boca and
Sauer, 2009), as observed in their employment patterns. The propensity to work
is also positively correlated with the level of education achieved (Del Boca, 1993
and 2002; Colombino and Di Tommaso, 1996; Addabbo, 1999; Bratti and
Staffolani, 2012). In fact, education can be seen as a proxy variable for “a posi-
tive taste” or “pure preference” for market work (Bowen and Finegan, 1969).
Type of contract and economic status are used to control for the different oppor-
tunities available to family components to give (receive) monetary contributions
to (from) the others (i.e. people with stable job conditions earn more than other
categories of workers) (Mussida and Picchio, 2011). Degree of kinship provides
evidence of gender attitudes towards reducing income inequality based on the
role in the household (i.e. head of household, spouse/partner, children). Details
of family composition, such as number of females, number of unemployed, etc.,
highlight how differences in the characteristics of households may emphasise
income inequalities among members. The geographic area of residence provides
information about labour market conditions and social capital (i.e. acceptability
of women working). Finally, controlling for the number of hours spent on child-
care and care for the elderly serves as a proxy for the time spent on unpaid work,
which contributes to explaining a lower ‘wage’ or share of income, compared to
other components that are relieved of this burden. Clearly, those more involved
in family activities have less time to allocate to a paid job, which explains the
risk of facing income inequality within the family and responds to the exchange
framework (Berneheim et al., 1985; Cox, 1987).
3.    DATA
Applying the OECD (2001) procedure, for each family component we
define the monetary contribution given (received) to (from) the other mem-
bers to reduce income inequality within the household, and provide evidence
of the determinants of these differences using the 2010 IT-Silc. The selected
sample consists of individuals over 17 years of age, living in a household
composed of at least two members (required to calculate the amount shared
with any other component). Self-employed people are excluded since this cat-
egory of worker has some specific characteristics that could bias our esti-
mates (e.g. income declared) and outliers with respect to income, according
to Hadi (1992 and 1994).1 The resulting sample size is 21,729 individuals, of
which 51.2% are female (see Table1). According to family status, in the sam-
1All these observations – apart from single households – were accounted for in the definition
of the variables related to the family, and only subsequently excluded.
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ple, around 32% are male household heads, 8% are female household heads,
31% are wives, 3% are husbands, 10% are daughters, and 12% are sons.
3.1 Dependent variable
The dependent variable is the amount of the monetary contribution each
component should give (receive) to (from) other family members to remove
potential income inequality. Since we do not have direct information on intra-
household transfers (IT-Silc data contain details only on monetary transfers
between households) we calculate this by applying the following strategy which
is in line with the OECD (2001) procedure.
Assuming that each family member’s consumption is equal to the per-capi-
ta income, we define and calculate several types of incomes.
Let Y1 be the total equivalent net household income defined as the sum of
personal income from labour and pensions of all family members plus other
sources of income at the household level,2 divided by the OECD equivalence
scale, which takes account of economies of scale based on family composition.
Table 1 – Sample size by gender and family status (number of observations)
Sources: Own elaboration of IT-Silc data (2010).
2To define the total household income we consider the following sources: imputed rent, income
from rentals, interest, dividends and other capital income, family/children allowances, other
social benefits, housing allowances, and regular inter-household cash transfers received.
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Let Y2 be the equivalent income calculated as the sum of only personal income
from labour and pensions of all household members, divided by the OECD
equivalence scale. Let Y3 be the per-capita income defined as the sum of person-
al income from labour and pensions of the individuals living in the household,
divided by the number of components. Finally, Y4 is the personal income from
labour and pensions. 
According to the OECD procedure (OECD 2001), three types of variables
are defined: T1 is unidentified resources, resulting from the difference between
Y1 and Y2 (i.e. Y1–Y2); T2 refers to the economies of scale and is defined as the
difference between Y2 and Y3; (i.e. Y2–Y3); and T3 is inaccurately termed intra-
household transfers, and is the difference between Y4 and Y3 (i.e. Y4 – Y3). Next,
we divide each of these monetary components by the total equivalent household
income (Y1) to provide the share of each component.
T3 is the core variable in our empirical exercise and may be negative or pos-
itive. We are aware that this variable does not properly show effective intra-
household transfers among family components, but rather measures the amount
an individual should give (receive) to (from) other family components in order
to nullify the income inequality amongst them (i.e. assuring that each member
has disposal of the per-capita income in the context of equal sharing of
resources).
Tables 2 and 3 report income decomposition using the OECD procedure
(i.e. the three variables ‘T’ described above and the personal income), by gen-
der and status respectively. In the male sub-sample (Table 2), about 99% of
the household’s disposable equivalent income derives from each individual’s
own financial sources (pension or wage), thus, they must contribute on aver-
age 37% of this amount to remove family income disparities. In the female
subsample, only 47% of their income derives from their personal income, and
they need to receive monetary contributions from the other components
(about 16%) to overcome their income inequality. Descriptive statistics show
that there are economies of scale, meaning that families composed of at least
two individuals can live more cheaply than single households (the benefit
provided by the economies of scale is around 33%) . Men are the main bread-
winners as they are more likely than women to promote equal consumption
among all family components.
With regard to family status (Table 2), we notice a significant difference for
the category of household head, namely that men contribute with 58% of the per-
capita income from labour and pensions to ensure income equality in the fami-
ly. Wives benefit from economies of scale related to the partnership (32.6%) and
from the contributions received (18.6%) from the other family members. These
results confirm the existence of gender differences, and suggest that men, on
average, provide more support in the form of income than women. Also, women
are generally recipients but female household heads positively contribute (about
14%). Overall, the personal incomes of children are below per-capita income,
but gender differences still emerge. In particular, daughters require a smaller
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contribution (about 18%) than sons (29%), from the other family members to
achieve per-capita income levels.
Figure 1 shows the distribution of monetary contributions by age and gen-
der. The age distribution is characterised by an inverted U shape and gender dif-
ferences are more pronounced if individuals are more likely to have a job. 
Table 2 – Income decomposition by gender and family status (%)
Sources: Own elaboration of IT-Silc data (2010).
Note: T1 (unidentified resources) results from the difference between total net equivalent and equivalent
net income from labour and pensions, T2 (economies of scale) results from the difference between net
equivalent and net per-capita income from labour and pensions; T3 (intra-households transfer) results from
the difference between net personal and net per-capita income from labour and pensions. All the variables
in the table are divided by the total net household equivalent income to obtain the share of it.
Source: Own elaboration of IT-Silc data (2010).
Figure 1 – Intra-household contribution by gender and age
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Relying on how T3 is defined has two important implications for our esti-
mates. First, family members with no personal income (e.g. inactive or unem-
ployed people), by construction, must benefit from the monetary contributions
of the other members to make consumption equal to the per-capita income. How-
ever, to avoid sample bias and misleading interpretations of the estimates, we did
not exclude them from our sample. Second, T3 may vary according to: 1) indi-
vidual personal income; 2) personal incomes of every other family component
as they affect household income; and 3) number of family members in the house-
hold, which affects both per-capita and equivalent income. The distribution of
the three types of income by gender and family status are presented in Table 3.
According to the distribution of incomes, what emerges is that women
generally have lower personal incomes than per-capita incomes (except for
female household heads) and males have higher personal incomes than per-
capita incomes, especially once they are household heads. Table 3 shows that
the difference between per-capita and personal income is smallest for female
household heads and largest for sons. 
3.2 Explanatory variables  
To test the effects of the determinants on the dependent variable, namely the
individual monetary contribution, we apply several controls: education level,
participation in the labour market, individuals' preferences, cultural and institu-
tional aspects, and the role within the family.
The covariates can be grouped into two categories. The first set of explana-
tory variables refers to individual characteristics. It includes age, age squared,
Sources: Own elaboration of IT-Silc data (2010).
Table 3 – Income distribution by gender and family status (euros)
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education dummies, area of residence, family status, type of contract, number
of hours spent on caring. The second identifies the set of information related
to family composition. It includes number of females, number of components
with permanent and fixed term contracts, number of unemployed, and house-
holds not in the labour force. Each of these variables is defined excluding the
respondent. In order to account for unpaid work, we include hours spent on
caring3 (for children, elderly, and the household) by each family component.
Table 4 presents a statistical summary of the explanatory variables by
gender. The average age of males and females is 48. Three dummies - North,
Centre, and South - capture the geographical area of residence: the majority
of our sample lives in the North. 
Education dummies are defined according to the International Standard
Classification of Education (ISCED). We distinguish particularly between
lower secondary or compulsory education, upper secondary and tertiary edu-
cation. For education, we find no gender differences: more than half of each
sub-sample achieved only compulsory education (about 51%). However, gen-
der differences emerge if we account for family status (around 66% of men
and 15% of women are household heads). The number of sons is slightly
higher than the number of daughters (25% vs 21%). With regard to type of
contract, the percentage of men with a full-time permanent contract is almost
twice that of women (43% vs 22%). Women are mainly inactive because this
category includes housewives (about 43% vs 13% of men). Finally, for the
variables on family composition, the descriptive statistics generally do not
show gender differences except for number of women, which is related to the
construction of the variable which excludes the respondent.
Regardless of any specific characteristics, men are more active than
women in equalizing family income (see Table 5).
Table 4 – Descriptive statistics by gender
...Cont’d...
3The variable describes the time spent on household work, child care and care for other depend-
ents, and is available only in the IT-Silc 2010 module on intra-household sharing resources.
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4.    FINDINGS
4.1 Estimates
The OLS regressions run on the entire sample and on the samples split by
gender are presented in Table 6. The dependent variable indicates the share of
Sources: Own elaboration of IT-Silc data (2010).
Table 4 – Cont’d
Table 5 – Mean of T3 by explanatory variables
Sources: Own elaboration of IT-Silc data (2010).
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personal monetary contribution of each family component (i.e. the difference
between personal and per-capita income divided by the total equivalent
household income), and can be positive or negative. Interpretation of the
coefficients of each covariate relies on the following statement: a positive
sign of an explanatory variable means that this characteristic either increases
the monetary contribution or reduces the amount received. The reverse
applies in the case of a negative sign. 
Considering age and age squared, the corresponding coefficients show
that the monetary contribution - required to level personal income with per-
capita income - exhibits an inverted U-shape with age; men reach a maxi-
mum at age 45 and women at age 52. This result suggests that men support
the consumption of family components financially from the start of their
work careers and reduces the amount of their monetary contribution only as
they get older. Several empirical contributions (see for instance, Del Boca,
2002; Di Tella and Mac Culloch, 2002; Jaumotte, 2003) show that women
start to contribute later in life when the risk of interruptions to work (for
instance due to pregnancy and childbirth) is smaller: women’s participation
in the labour market is more related to their life cycle. Also, females may face
lower employment rates before the age of 30 because they are still in educa-
tion; this increases the likelihood of a negative amount of contribution. How-
ever, for women, once type of contract is controlled for, age stops influenc-
ing the monetary contribution. 
For geographical area of residence, the estimates reflect the diverse eco-
nomic conditions and inefficiencies that characterise Italy. Regardless of gen-
der, it is noticeable that, because of the poor labour market conditions, peo-
ple living in the South have a lower propensity to provide monetary contri-
butions to other family components. However, if we control for type of con-
tract, people living in the South positively contribute to levelling income
inequalities within the family (while the opposite is true for people living in
the North), especially for women. This suggests that if we disentangle from
the variable South the effect of the poor labour market conditions, there is a
difference in social and culture attitudes in this geographical area, resulting
from a higher propensity to level income differences within the family. Not
surprisingly, level of education achieved (for both men and women) positive-
ly affects the monetary contribution: overall, people with an education level
beyond the compulsory schooling are more likely to share a part of their
income with the other components. It is noticeable that if we account for type
of contract, the level of education for males no longer affects the size of the
contribution. This result can be interpreted within the human capital frame-
work, which suggests that the labour market opportunities are better for high-
er educated individuals, and therefore the type of contract can be seen as a
measure of the level of education achieved as well as of the economic condi-
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tions. By contrast, women with higher levels of education are shown to con-
tribute more than their male counterparts if we include information on eco-
nomic status. This result is in line with national statistics that show that
labour market participation is higher for better educated women (i.e. 58.5%
and 72% for upper secondary school and tertiary education, respectively)
(ISTAT, 2009), and with the empirical evidence provided by Bratti and
Staffolani (2012), which suggests that women with university education tend
to have a full-time job.
Each household member has a specific role in the family: household
heads (regardless of gender) are more generous, since they contribute more
than any other household member. Sons show a lower propensity to positive-
ly contribute to reduce income inequality compared to other household mem-
bers. Also husbands (not classified as household heads) contribute more to
levelling income inequalities, while the opposite is true for wives. 
As expected, the results for type of contract show that individuals with
permanent jobs are significantly more likely to share a part of their personal
income within the family. Clearly, intrinsic characteristics associated with
this type of contract - job tenure, higher wage, and better welfare provision -
explain why this variable is a good predictor of the propensity to reduce
income inequality within the family. Apart from those with atypical contract
forms, part-time workers experience less favourable financial conditions.
Those who are not part of the labour market contribute negatively to level-
ling income differences, regardless of gender.
Considering the explanatory variables related to the household compo-
sition of respondents, excluding the focal respondent, the patterns by gender
are quite similar, but the size of the coefficients differs. A unit change in the
number of women living in a specific household increases the amount an
individual gives to a family component or reduces the amount received,
mainly in the case of males. Regardless of gender, the dynamics are similar
for inactive and unemployed members. Overall, independent of the type of
contract, the higher the number of employed (unemployed) individuals in the
family, the smaller (greater) is the amount given to (received by) each com-
ponent, especially in the case of men.
Finally, family members who are more involved in family activities have
less time to allocate to paid jobs; hence, they can be expected to contribute
less than other members to reducing income inequalities, and the unpaid
work is exchanged for monetary contributions from the other family compo-
nents.
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4.2 Further investigations
To ease interpretation of the flows of monetary contributions and the
amounts potentially received from or given to other family components, we cal-
culated predicted values for some individuals. The plots are reported in Figure
2. We separate individuals into seven categories according to their economic
status in the labour market. Workers are categorised according to type of con-
Table 6 – Estimates of monetary contribution using OLS model
Note: * p<.1; **'p<.05; *** p<.01 Reference categories: Centre; Compulsory education; Other members;
Permanent full-time.
Sources: Own elaboration of IT-Silc data (2010).
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tract (permanent vs temporary), and the work hours (part-time vs full-time);
non-workers are categorised as unemployed or inactive. Each value is comput-
ed assuming that the monetary contribution will vary with gender, age and role
in the household, for example, household head or child. Household heads and
children living in the North with upper secondary school diplomas, and the
remaining covariates (number of women, of unemployed, of components with
permanent and temporary contracts, and hours spent caring) are held constant;
each value is equal to the sample mean. We can provide this graphical infor-
mation because economic status is treated as an ordinal variable, that is, we
assume that a temporary contract is less good than a permanent contract thus
full-time work is preferable to part-time work. The predicted values are pro-
vided by gender for each category; hence, we can only compare between sons
and male household heads and between daughters and female household
heads, taking all the remaining family components as the reference category
for each sub-sample.
In general, independent of gender, the predictions highlight that individu-
als with more stable work contracts are more likely to support the consumption
of other family components since they will provide a positive monetary contri-
bution. As expected, sons contribute less than other male family members and
daughters less than other female family members. Figure 2 shows that the size
of the contribution increases with age. For instance, in the category of full-time
permanent workers, the contribution of a 50-year-old male household head is
bigger than the contribution of a younger household head. A 30-year old house-
hold head with a part-time permanent contract contributes up to 74.2% towards
equalising household income differences, rising to about 83.7% at age 60. The
female sub-sample shows several differences. The monetary contribution of a
woman of the same economic status does not significantly change with age.
This might be due to the fact that women are more likely to be hired in sectors
where career prospects are limited and wage profiles flatten.
Finally, and probably not surprisingly, sons and daughters provide less
support to the rest of the family even if they are employed: their monetary con-
tribution is positive only if they have a permanent contract.
5.   CONCLUSIONS
This paper set out to define and investigate intra-family income differ-
ences in Italy. We calculated an indicator using information on personal and
household incomes. On this measure, family components can positively con-
tribute to promoting equal consumption among family members through the
sharing of part of their resources with member(s) with lower personal
incomes. Considering that this kind of survey rarely collects data on mone-
tary transfers within the family, the empirical evidence is narrow, and pro-
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vides little information on what determines the size of the monetary contribu-
tion made to negate family income differences. In this work, in order to pro-
vide more evidence on income differences in Italy among family components
we used 2010 IT-Silc data. We applied an indicator for monetary transfers
within the family and then described the variables for family income differ-
ences in Italy. Our focus on the Italian case was driven by the typical house-
hold composition in Italy where it is common to find intergenerational co-
residence, the tendency of young adults to postpone departure from their
parental home, lower female labour force participation, and disparities
amongst family components about time spent on household work, child care
and care for other members. In order to highlight gender differences, we also
performed the regressions separately for men and women.
Our results show that monetary contributions vary by gender. In particu-
lar, more educated women are more likely to be able to equalise consumption
Figure 2 – Predicted values by type of contract, gender, whether head 
of household or spouse or children and age profile 
Note: For each predicted value we assume that the individual is living in the North, has achieved high
school diploma level, and is living in a family composed of some women, some unemployed components,
some components with permanent and temporary contracts, which is equal to the sample mean. 1 = per-
manent full time; 2 = permanent part time; 3 = full-time, not permanent; 4 = permanent part time; 5 = other
workers; 6 = retired and other inactive; 7 = unemployed.
Sources: Own elaboration of IT-Silc data (2010).
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among family components than less educated women. For men, education is
not significant if we introduce economic activities into the regression. In rela-
tion to predicted values, we find that men and women behave differently
based on age. Men provide more support as they get older, but for women
there are no significant differences across ages. As expected, more stable
labour contracts enhance the probability of making a positive contribution to
the other family members. Regardless of gender, part-time workers have the
least favourable financial conditions. In relation to the children in the family,
sons and daughters are more likely to be in need of monetary contributions to
achieve the per-capita income level of the other family components. 
In summary, what emerges from this exercise is the persistence of gen-
der differences in attitudes to removing family income inequalities. In the
family structure analysed, the estimates confirm the persistence of a model in
which men are the breadwinners. Individuals more involved in unpaid work
have less time to allocate to a paid job, which enhances the risk of facing
income inequality. Despite employment flexibility and equal wage laws,
women’s earnings still lag behind those of men. Only those women who are
higher educated and/or have stable job contracts are able to share a larger part
of their income with others in the family. The persistence of gender differ-
ences amongst family members suggests that policy interventions implement-
ed to promote equal opportunities during the recent years failed once we
analysed the effects at the household level. In fact, the emerging income
inequality within the family is related to the behaviour of the women, which
is related to the life cycle events (i.e. pregnancy, childbirth, child and family
care, discontinuity in labour force participation), the bargaining power in the
family, the lack of family friendly schemes, and social and cultural norms (i.e.
males as the breadwinners). As a consequence, to overcome income inequal-
ities between households, policy makers should define interventions to pro-
mote equal opportunities for family members despite their role and gender. 
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